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Abstract 
 
The Whitman Administration’s 30 percent reduction in New Jersey’s personal income 
taxes from 1994-96 is prominently cited as a role model for state fiscal policy.  We investigate 
whether the growth benefits attributed to the Whitman tax cuts are warranted.  Panel data 
methods are applied to annual observations of county-level employment growth from New 
Jersey and the surrounding economic region.  Our analysis does not support the hypothesis that 
tax cuts stimulated employment growth in New Jersey.  While New Jersey did experience 
substantial employment growth subsequent to the tax cuts, most of this growth was shared by the 
nearby Economic Areas.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
State fiscal policy follows a distinct cyclical pattern.  While tax increases are a typical 
response to budget shortfalls (often required by balanced budget legislation), tax cuts are offered 
as an economic stimulant.  Academic research, however, offers little guidance regarding such tax 
policy decisions. 
Economic theory offers a range of models regarding the growth impacts of changes in 
state fiscal policy.  Tax cuts could stimulate economic growth by altering incentives to save, 
invest, and participate in the work force.  Tax cuts, however, may be coupled with changes in 
expenditures.  Both the distortionary nature of the tax scheme, as well as the productive nature of 
public spending, affect overall growth outcomes.  In addition, tax mimicking behavior can 
mitigate the potential stimulative effects of reducing a state’s tax burden (Besley and Case, 1995; 
Case, 1993).  Of course, if state economic growth is exogenous, then tax policy changes will not 
affect long-run economic growth.   
The empirical literature does not clarify the relationship between state tax policy changes 
and economic growth.1  Some surveys suggest that state tax cuts have a positive, but very 
modest, impact on economic development (Bartik, 1991; Phillips and Gross, 1995; Wasylenko, 
1997).  Several prominent studies conclude that state tax cuts paid for by reduced spending on 
public services—as opposed to transfer payments—have a negative impact on economic 
development (Helms, 1985, page 579; Mofidi and Stone, 1990, page 691; Bartik, 1991, page 48; 
Tannenwald, 1996, page 25; Lynch, 1996, page 19).2  To the extent a consensus exists, it is that 
previous results should be viewed as unreliable and uncertain.3   
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Several estimation problems, including misspecification, measurement error of key 
policy variables, and endogeneity of tax changes, contribute to the unreliability of the academic 
literature (Carroll and Wasylenko, 1994; Phillips and Gross, 1995; Becsi, 1996).  Endogeneity 
arises because states tend to raise (lower) taxes in poor (good) economic times.  To resolve the 
inherent estimation problems, Poot (2000) and others have called for studies that “rely on natural 
‘experiments’--studies that observe how similar local economies…respond to large, exogenous 
changes in tax regimes” (Bartik, 1997, page 68). 
Notably, the promoters of tax-cutting policies base their recommendations primarily on 
individual state experiences.  A prominently mentioned “role model” is the New Jersey 
experience under the leadership of Governor Christine Todd Whitman (Garfield, 1996; Moore 
and Stansel, 1996).  Whitman spearheaded a cumulative thirty-percent reduction in state personal 
income tax from 1994-96.  Reviewing state tax changes since the late 1960, we conclude that 
New Jersey offers a rare case of a tax-cutting policy resembling a “natural experiment” with a 
large, exogenous tax cut.4   
Our study investigates whether the growth benefits attributed to the Whitman tax cuts are 
warranted.  Unlike typical studies of state tax impacts, our analysis applies panel data methods to 
county-level (rather than state-level) data for New Jersey and the surrounding economic region.5  
Following an event-study format, impacts are measured using annual observations of 
employment growth before and after the respective tax cuts.  Our results suggest that undue 
credit is attributed to the Whitman tax cuts. Although New Jersey did experience substantial 
growth in the time period coinciding with the tax cuts, the adjoining region shared most of this 
growth.  The residual growth specific to New Jersey is not statistically significant.   
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2.  BACKGROUND ON THE 1994-1996 NEW JERSEY TAX CUTS 
The recession of the early 1990's resulted in significant state tax increases across the 
country.  As the economy was beginning to recover from the recession, tax relief, fiscal 
responsibility and smaller government were common themes in the campaign platforms.  The 
ubiquity of voter discontent was evident from the 1994 national elections results.  In Congress, 
voters elected a Republican majority to the House of Representatives for the first time since 
1953.  Of the 36 gubernatorial elections, there were 16 changes in the political affiliations of the 
elected governors.6  Twelve of the changes, including New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, 
went from Democratic to Republican.  
The implementation of the New Jersey tax cuts under Whitman was unique even for a 
new governor.7  Whitman distinguished herself by publicly announcing a very specific, tax-
cutting plan long before she was elected to office.  In her 1993 gubernatorial campaign, Whitman 
heavily emphasized her ambitious plan to reduce personal income taxes across the board by ten 
percent each of her first three years in office.8  Not driven by budget surpluses, Whitman’s tax 
plan was widely criticized by those who feared it would lead to massive deficits (Mullaney, 
1994, page 268).  Subsequent to being elected, Governor Whitman immediately moved to have 
her tax plan implemented as promised.  Whitman is widely credited with being the primary 
political orchestrator of the New Jersey tax cuts. 
The Whitman tax cuts represent a significant departure from the tax regimes of the other 
states in the Mideast region faced with similar economic forces.9  As confirmed in Table 1, New 
Jersey's tax cuts came primarily from reductions in the personal income tax. The result of the 
New Jersey tax cuts was a cumulative, thirty-percent reduction in New Jersey’s personal income 
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tax for most state residents, phased in over a three-year period from 1994-1996.    The other 
states in the Mideast region also enacted some reductions in personal and corporate income taxes 
during the 1994-97.10  As Gold (1996) emphasizes, however, measuring the size of tax changes 
is notoriously difficult.  This makes cross-state comparisons problematic.   
Table 2 reports the NCSL estimates of revenue impacts among the Mideast region states 
using two alternative accounting methods: the baseline and the tax liability methods.  The middle 
section of Table 2 uses the NCSL baseline method to calculate revenue impacts relevant for the 
calendar years 1989-1997.  The left hand side of the table reports the fiscal year in which the tax 
changes were enacted.  By this measure, the Jersey tax cuts appear to be significantly larger than 
the cuts in the other states in the region.11  Furthermore, New Jersey is the only state to have 
enacted “major” tax changes in three consecutive years.12 
The baseline estimates, however, are subject to criticism.  Under this method changes are 
measured against the obligation that would have existed had no tax action been taken.  Thus, if a 
scheduled tax reduction were postponed through legislative action, it would count as a tax 
increase even though the effective tax liability did not change from the previous year.  From 
1990 through 1994, New York postponed reductions in personal income taxes that had been 
scheduled to occur in previous legislation.  According to the baseline (but not the tax liability) 
method, these postponements are counted as tax increases.  In addition, the baseline method only 
measures changes in the first fiscal year for which the legislation is implemented, understating 
the effect of multi-year tax cut legislation.  Both New Jersey and New York had multi-year tax 
cut legislation during the period. 
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The lower section of Table 2 uses the tax liability method to calculate revenue impacts 
for the calendar years 1994-1997.13  The left side of the table reports the fiscal years during 
which the tax changes had their impact, as opposed to when the tax legislation was enacted.  
Using this method, it appears that both New Jersey and New York enacted significant tax cuts 
during the 1994-1997 fiscal year period.  The big difference between New Jersey and New York 
lies in the timing of their respective tax cuts.  The Whitman tax cuts were concentrated in the 
beginning of the 1994-1997 period, while the New York tax cuts were concentrated at the end of 
this period.   
Our background investigation supports two essential claims about the New Jersey tax 
cuts. First, like a “natural experiment,” they were instituted independently of factors specific to 
the state’s economic growth.  Second, they represented a significant departure from the tax 
regimes of states in the same economic region.  New Jersey’s tax cuts were substantially larger 
and more frequent than those in the rest of the Mideast Region, with the possible exception of 
New York.  The subsequent empirical analysis addresses this ambiguity by including regression 
specifications that separate out New York.   
 
3.  ESTIMATION 
Given the estimation problems identified above, we employ an “event-study” framework 
to estimate the effects of the 1994-1996 New Jersey tax-cuts.14  Essentially, this approach 
consists of a “before-after” comparison of New Jersey’s employment growth.  For the “before” 
period, we choose 1989-1993.  Employment growth during this period is compared with the 
period 1994-1997, which captures the cumulative effects of the 3-year period of tax cuts.  We 
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condition this comparison on employment growth in neighboring geographical areas, so that our 
approach may also be thought of as a variation of “difference-in-differences.”   
The Whitman tax cuts attracted attention given the size of the tax cuts and the subsequent 
robust economic growth.  We define employment growth, EMPGT, as  
(1) 1001
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As shown in Table 3, the years immediately preceding the Whitman tax cuts (1989-1993) were 
characterized by poor employment growth.15 Employment declined in the years 1990 through 
1992 with modest annual employment growth of 0.72 percent in 1993.  The first year of the 
multi-year tax cut (1994) was also characterized by a modest employment gain of 0.97 percent.  
It was followed by three subsequent years of robust growth of 1.54, 1.27, and 2.14 percent a 
year.   
An OLS estimate of employment growth indicates that New Jersey’s annual employment 
growth rate was 1.50 percentage points greater in the tax cut period 1994-1997 compared with 
the pre-tax cut period.16  When a county-level analogue is estimated using observations of 
employment growth in the 21 New Jersey counties and county-fixed effects, we find that New 
Jersey’s counties grew at an annual rate that was 1.72 percentage points higher in the tax cut 
years compared to the pre-tax cut years.17 
It is not clear that New Jersey’s robust employment growth in the tax-cut years differed 
from that of the regional economy.  Given that regional economic shocks can play important 
roles in explaining economic growth differentials, we consider alternative geographic area 
definitions.18  BEA “Economic Regions” are defined by grouping states according to 
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commonality of economic activity.  In contrast, BEA “Economic Areas” group counties 
according to their degree of economic interrelatedness, as defined by commuting patterns.  They 
consist of 
“…one or more economic nodes—metropolitan areas or similar areas that serve 
as centers of economic activity—and the surrounding counties that are 
economically related to the nodes.  (Johnson, 1995, p. 75).” 
 
For the purposes of this study, Economic Areas are preferable to Economic Regions since 
counties from closely related Economic Areas are more likely to share a common, regional shock 
than counties located within the same Economic Region but different Economic Areas.  
We define three relevant economic regions.  The first region, the BEA Mideast Region, is 
shown in Figure 1A.  As represented in Figure 1B, the second region consists of the BEA 
Economic Areas that either directly contain New Jersey counties, or are contiguous to Economic 
Areas that do—Economic Areas 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.  The third and narrowest region includes 
the two Economic Areas that directly contain New Jersey counties—Economic Areas 10 and 12.  
Table 4 reports the allocation of counties across states according to alternative definitions of 
economic region.  Notably, the economic regions defined using BEA Economic Areas draw the 
great majority of their counties from the Mideast Region.  As a result, our earlier conclusions 
about the uniqueness of New Jersey’s tax cuts relative to the region remain applicable when 
using these latter two regional definitions.  
We construct a panel of observations for each of our sets of counties and estimate the 
fixed-effect model,   
(2) ,ittitiit 93POST TAXCUT EMPGT εγβα +++=  ( )2,0~ σε Nit , 
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where i = 1, 2,…, N; t=1989,1990,…,1997; αi is a county-specific fixed effect; TAXCUT is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to New Jersey during the years 
1994-1997; and POST93 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 during the years 1994-1997 
and applies to all counties.  Note that the total number of counties is given by N = N1 + N2 + … 
+ NS, where Ns is the number of counties in state s, and S is the number of states.19   
The dummy variable, TAXCUT, is used to model the change in New Jersey’s tax regime, 
à la a typical difference-in-difference approach.  This approach is warranted given the practical 
difficulties in measuring the size of tax changes.20  In addition to the problems discussed in Gold 
(1996), there are ambiguities in how to treat multi-year tax changes as well as those that are 
legislated retroactively, and in choosing between annual versus cumulative revenue estimates to 
assess tax impacts.21  There is also substantial measurement error associated with estimating the 
revenue impacts of various tax changes.22  Further, estimates of the size of the tax cuts are 
calculated for fiscal years while economic growth data, such as employment, are measured for 
calendar years.  Consequently, a straightforward mapping of quantitative measures of tax cuts to 
economic growth data is not practical.   
Rows (2) through (4) of Table 5 report the results of estimating equation (2) with OLS.  
Note that the sum of the coefficients for TAXCUT and POST93 equals the previous estimate of 
POST93 in row (1) that was attained using just the New Jersey counties.  In other words, the 
original coefficient for POST93 is decomposed into a regional-specific component (POST93) 
and the New Jersey-specific component (TAXCUT).  The coefficient on the TAXCUT variable 
identifies the residual growth that remains after correcting for contemporaneous regional growth. 
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 The OLS results suggest that much of New Jersey’s growth during the tax cut years was 
shared by counties in the surrounding region.  For example, focusing first on row (2), we 
estimate that annual employment growth for all counties in the Mideast Region was 0.896 
percentage points larger in 1994-1997 than it was in 1989-1993.  The estimated TAXCUT 
coefficient indicates that annual employment growth in New Jersey’s counties during the tax cut 
years was 0.821 percentage points more than what could have been expected from regional 
growth alone. 
 The estimated tax impact decreases substantially if we define the relevant region as 
Economic Areas 10-14.  Including a region-specific growth component reduces the coefficient 
on TAXCUT to 0.389 (cf. row (3)), a substantial reduction.  Based on the associated t-value of 
1.20, the hypothesis of no increased growth cannot be rejected at conventional significance 
levels.  The results are similar when the definition of region is narrowed to those BEA Economic 
Areas that directly contain New Jersey counties (Economic Areas 10 and 12).  For this case, a 
TAXCUT coefficient of 0.424 is estimated (cf. row (4)).  While the associated standard error is 
somewhat smaller than the previous case, the coefficient is still insignificant at the 10 percent 
level.   
It is not surprising that the results are sensitive to the regional definition used in the 
analysis.  BEA Regions are broad groups of states with a commonality of economic activity.  In 
contrast, Economic Areas are constructed to more carefully identify areas linked by functional 
ties.  Thus, estimates associated with Economic Areas are likely to be the most reliable measures 
of tax-cut effects.23  
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The estimates presented in this section highlight the importance of accounting for overall 
regional growth and the sensitivity of the estimated impacts to the regional definition.  The next 
section investigates a number of issues that may lead to better estimates, including within-state 
correlation, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation. 
 
4.  ESTIMATION REFINEMENTS 
 While contributing additional information and leading to more precise confidence 
intervals, the use of county-level data to analyze state-level policies potentially violates the 
assumption of independence across observations.  In other words, it would be wrong to assume 
that the 21 counties of New Jersey represent 21 independent “natural experiments” of the impact 
of tax policy on economic growth.  Moulton (1990) demonstrates that “even small levels of 
correlation [e.g., across counties within a state] can cause the standard errors from ordinary least 
squares to be seriously biased downward.”  In addition, the panel nature of the data suggests that 
both groupwise heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation may be present, causing OLS to be 
inefficient and its standard errors to be biased. 
 Let ( )V0,~ Nε , where ε is the vector of error terms from equation (2) above.  The 
combination of (i) within-state correlation, (ii) groupwise (state-level) heteroscedasticity, and 
(iii) first-order autocorrelation produces a covariance matrix V defined by  
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sρ  is the correlation of the error terms between counties from the same state s, 2sσ  is the 
variance of the error term for counties (observations) from state s, and ρ  is a common AR(1) 
parameter, assuming that the observations are ordered first by state, then by county, and then by 
time.  This model is easily seen to be a variation of the widely used Park model (Park, 1967; 
Kmenta, 1986, pages 616-625).24 
 We proceed by obtaining consistent estimates of the elements of V, which in turn enables 
feasible GLS (FGLS) estimation of the model.  The benefit of FGLS is that it produces 
coefficient estimates that are asymptotically efficient.  However, Monte Carlo analysis of the 
Park model by Beck and Katz (1995) suggests that FGLS may produce standard errors that are 
substantially downwardly biased in finite samples.  In contrast, they report that OLS standard 
errors, appropriately corrected for V, are likely to be more reliable.  As a result, we report both 
OLS with corrected standard errors and FGLS results. 
 Table 6 reports the results of reestimating equation (2), first using OLS where the 
standard errors are corrected for the error structure of equation (3), then using FGLS.25  
Referring to Rows (1) and (2) of Table 6, we see that the corrected standard errors are 
approximately three times larger than the biased standard errors produced by OLS.  Virtually all 
of this bias can be attributed to the allowance for within-state correlation.  This result is similar 
to that reported by Moulton (1990); and virtually identical to Duggan (2000), who performs an 
empirical analysis conceptually similar to ours. 
Despite the dramatic change in the size of the standard errors, the conclusions from the 
original OLS analysis remain the same: The coefficient for the dummy variable designed to 
capture unaccounted, region-wide growth during 1994-1997 (POST93) is still significant at the 1 
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percent level.  The coefficient for the dummy variable designed to measure New Jersey-specific 
growth during the tax cut years (TAXCUT) is still insignificant (with associated p-values now in 
the 60 percent range).  The FGLS results reported in Rows (3) and (4) likewise support these 
conclusions. 
There remains one more estimation concern.  We concluded in Section 2 that New 
Jersey’s tax cuts were substantially larger and more frequent than those of other states in the 
region, with the possible exception of New York.  We now want to allow for “the possible 
exception of New York.”  To do that we construct a dummy variable, NY_DUMMY, which takes 
the value 1 if the observation is (i) located in the state of New York and (ii) occurs in the time 
period 1994-1997.  The resulting specification is given by equation (4),  
(4) itittitiit NY_DUMMY 93POST TAXCUT EMPGT εδγβα ++++= . 
Rows (5) through (8) report the results of estimating this equation first with OLS (with 
corrected standard errors), then with FGLS.  The NY_DUMMY coefficient is highly insignificant 
in each of the four regressions.  Overall, the results concerning New Jersey’s economic growth 
are little changed from above.  (While it is true that the FGLS coefficient for the TAXCUT 
coefficient is estimated to be larger when using the region defined by BEA Economic Areas 10 
and 12 (cf. Row (8)), the point estimate of 0.649 lies less than a standard deviation (0.801) from 
zero and has an associated p-value of 0.42.) 
If we take the averages of the 8 sets of coefficients reported in Table 6, we see that 
approximately three-fourths of New Jersey’s increased economic growth in the 1994-1997 
period was shared by counties outside the state but within the same economic region.  The 
residual growth specific to New Jersey was not statistically significant: The p-values associated 
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with the TAXCUT coefficient was larger than 40 percent in each of the 8 regressions reported in 
Table 6. 
As a final check for any tax cut effects, we specify the OLS model of equation (2) with 
individual TAXCUT dummy variables for New Jersey’s 21 counties.  This specification allows us 
to estimate a separate tax cut effect for each New Jersey county.  While we do not report the full 
regression here, the individual impacts are represented in Figure 2.26  As the figure indicates, 
individual effects vary widely.  Four of the 21 effects are estimated to be negative.  None of the 
21 effects are individually significant and we cannot reject the joint hypothesis that all of the 
respective TAXCUT coefficients are equal to zero. 
To summarize, our analysis set out to determine whether employment growth in New 
Jersey during 1994-1997 differed from employment growth in other areas within the same 
economic region.  Our conclusion--robust across a wide variety of estimation procedures--is that 
it did not.  While New Jersey experienced strong growth during this period, so did the economies 
of the neighboring Economic Areas. 
An alternative interpretation of our results is that perhaps New Jersey’s tax cuts were 
effective in stimulating employment growth, and that this growth “radiated” outward, stimulating 
growth in neighboring Economic Areas.  This interpretation could also explain why we don’t 
observe much difference between New Jersey and the surrounding Economic Areas.   
If the alternative explanation were valid, however, one would expect to see the difference 
decreasing as one moved closer to New Jersey.  Accordingly, the TAXCUT coefficient should be 
smaller when using BEA Economic Areas 10 and 12 (those that directly include New Jersey) 
than when using BEA Economic Areas 10-14.  In fact, the opposite is true.  A comparison of the 
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odd Rows with the even Rows in Table 6 shows that the employment growth difference between 
New Jersey and its surrounding area gets larger, not smaller, when one restricts the analysis to 
the counties from Economic Areas that are closest to New Jersey.   
Finally, a potential criticism of our study is that it adopts the framework of a “natural 
experiment” and assumes that New Jersey’s tax cuts can be modeled as an exogenous experiment 
in state policy.  In fact, however, to the extent that this criticism is valid, it only strengthens our 
conclusion.  A positive correlation between economic growth and the adoption and continuance 
of New Jersey’s tax cut program would cause the TAXCUT coefficient to be positively biased.  
This would make it more likely that we would find the residual growth specific to New Jersey to 
be statistically significant.  The fact that we do not find statistical significance, even given a 
possible positive bias, makes our empirical findings even stronger. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
New Jersey has two characteristics that make it an interesting case study for analyzing the 
impact of a large, state-level personal income tax cut.  First, it can be argued that the 1994-1996 
New Jersey tax cuts were driven by factors exogenous to the state economy (i.e., the Whitman 
effect), making it a good candidate for a “natural experiment.”  Second, it is a state that is 
frequently identified as a “role model” for policy makers contemplating tax cuts for their states.   
While New Jersey experienced substantial employment growth during the period 1994-
1997, we conclude that most of this growth cannot be attributed to the tax cuts.  Robust 
employment growth during this period was not unique to New Jersey.  It is important to note, 
however, that our analysis is concerned with measuring the short-term impact of state-level tax 
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policy.  We do not address the issue of long-term impact, which raises a different set of 
econometric and specification issues. 
An additional contribution of this study is that it introduces a number of empirical 
innovations in its study of state tax policy.  It demonstrates the benefits of using county-level 
data, while also identifying the econometric issues that arise when the analysis of state policies 
are moved to the county level.  Further, it highlights the role that BEA Economic Areas can play 
in controlling for unobserved regional shocks.  The potential impact of spatial autocorrelation 
may also be important, though we leave this to future research. 
As for the general question of the benefits of cutting taxes, we believe that the main 
lessons from our analysis of the New Jersey model do not provide support for those who promote 
tax-cutting policies to stimulate growth.  However, we also find no evidence to indicate that the 
Whitman tax cuts hurt economic growth.  This reinforces the general consensus among 
academics that the primary focus of state-level tax and expenditure debates should be the relative 
merits of public versus private spending, and not the impact of these policies on aggregate 
economic activity.   
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Nature and Estimated Size of Tax Changes: New Jersey, 1994-1996 
 
 Estimated Impact Compared to Absence of Policy Change1 
 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 
 
Public Laws of 1994: 
    
   Ch. 2: Gross income tax cut for 1994 liability  $(52) $(298) $(263) $(303) 
   Ch. 3: Removal of 0.375% corporate business tax (CBT) 
surtax 
$(2) $(38) $(38) $(38) 
   Ch. 8: Increase in the income tax filing threshold  $(28) $(28) $(28) 
   Ch. 69: Gross income tax cut for 1995 liability  $(131) $(318) $(362) 
    1994 Subtotal $(54) $(495) $(647) $(731) 
     
Public Laws of 1995:     
   Ch. 165: Gross income tax cut for 1996 liability   $(222) $(540) 
   Ch. 184, 245, 246, and 317: Elimination of sales tax on 
yellow pages advertising; revision of CBT 
apportionment formula; reduction in CBT rate; sales 
tax exemption for broadcast equipment 
  $(9) $(48) 
   1995 Subtotal     $(231) $(588) 
     
Public Laws of 1996:    $(100) 
   Ch. 60: Introduction of income tax deduction for property 
taxes 
    
   1996 Subtotal    $(100) 
     
Cumulative Size Of Tax Changes: $(54)) $(495) $(878) 
 
$(1419) 
 
 
SOURCE:  Office of Tax Analysis, Department of Treasury, State of New Jersey (1998). 
1  The unit of measurement for the estimated impacts is millions of dollars. 
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TABLE 2 
Estimated Revenue Impacts of Major Tax Changes in the BEA Mideast Region: 1989-1997 
 
 
 
Delaware 
 
Maryland 
 
New Jersey 
 
New York 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Change % Change % Change % Change % Change % 
 
   Estimated Impacts:  Baseline Method: 
 
1989-90 $20.2 1.8 NA --- $2,225.0 21.2 $1,249.0 4.7 NA --- 
1990-91 $76.4 6.8 $90.1 1.4 -$20.0 -0.2 $1,200.0 4.2 $3,167.0 24.0 
1991-92 -$2.0 -0.2 $393.5 6.1 -$609.0 -5.2 $1,427.0 5.0 -$459.6 -3.5 
1992-93 $9.0 0.7 $2.2 0.0 $28.5 0.2 $1,493.8 4.8 NA --- 
 
1993-94 
 
-$5.5 
 
-0.4 
 
-$1.0 
 
-0.0 
 
-$665.0 
 
-5.1 
 
$914.0 
 
2.9 
 
-$167.0 
 
-1.0 
1994-95 -$18.4 -1.3 -$2.3 -0.0 -$260.0 -1.9 $285.0 0.9 -$281.0 -1.6 
1995-96 -$12.5 -0.9 -$1.5 -0.0 -$132.3 -1.0 $368.0 1.1 $10.1 0.1 
1996-97 -$2.0 -0.1 -$39.5 -0.5 $78.5 0.5 -$803.5 -2.4 $76.0 0.4 
 
   Estimated Impacts:  Tax Liability  Method: 
 
1994-95 -$5.5 -0.3 -$30.3 -0.2 -$705.0 -2.9 -$441.0 -0.7 -$167.0 -0.6 
1995-96 -$18.4 -1.0 -$4.5 -0.0 -$260.0 -1.0 -$944.0 -1.3 -$281.0 -1.0 
1996-97 -$12.5 -0.6 -$1.5 -0.0 -$143.0 -0.5 -$1,971.0 -2.8 $10.1 0.0 
1997-98 -$2.0 -0.1 -$39.5 -0.3 -$1.5 -0.0 -$806.5 -1.1 $76.0 0.3 
           
 
 
NOTES: Change values are in millions of dollars. Percentages are calculated on the basis of the state and local tax revenues from the 
previous fiscal year. NA indicates no major tax actions were taken in the fiscal year. 
 
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using revenue estimates from NCSL's State Tax Actions for years 1990-97 and Census estimates of 
state and local government tax revenues. 
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TABLE 3 
Annual Growth Rates in New Jersey’s Employment: 1989-1997 
 
 
Year 
 
EMPGT 
 
1989 
 
0.84 
1990 -1.22 
1991 -2.96 
1992 -0.04 
1993 0.72 
1994 0.97 
1995 1.54 
1996 1.27 
1997 2.14 
 
 
 
NOTE:  Employment growth is defined by 1001
Employment
EmploymentEMPGT
1t
t
t ×⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−
. 
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TABLE 4 
Distribution of Counties Across Alternative Economic Region Definitions 
 
 
 
State 
BEA Mideast 
Region 
BEA Economic 
Areas 10-14* 
BEA Economic 
Areas 10 and 12* 
 
Connecticut 
 
---- 
 
8 
 
8 
Delaware 3 3 2 
Maryland 24 24 1 
Massachusetts  4 4 
New Jersey 21 21 21 
New York 62 14 14 
Pennsylvania 67 34 25 
Vermont ---- 1 1 
Virginia ---- 22 ---- 
West Virginia ---- 9 ---- 
    
Total Number of Counties 177 
 
140 76 
Total Number of Observations 1593 
 
1260 684 
 
 
* “BEA Economic Areas” are listed in Johnson (1995). 
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TABLE 5 
Estimated Impact of New Jersey’s Tax Cuts 
(Dependent Variable = EMPGT) 
 
 
Row 
 
Geographic Area 
 
Number of 
Observations/ 
Counties 
 
Estimation 
 Procedure 
 
Estimated  
TAXCUT 
Coefficient 
 
Estimated 
POST93 
Coefficient 
 
R2 
       
(1) New Jersey  189/21 
  
OLS 
 
1.717*** 
(0.236) 
 
---- 0.4284 
       
(2) Mideast Region 1593/177 
OLS-With 
Conventional Standard 
Errors 
0.821*** 
(0.266) 
0.896*** 
(0.091) 0.3240 
(3) Economic Areas  10-14 1260/140 
OLS-With 
Conventional Standard 
Errors 
0.390 
(0.325) 
1.328*** 
(0.126) 0.3820 
(4) Economic Areas  10 and 12 684/76 
OLS-With 
Conventional Standard 
Errors 
0.424 
0.283 
1.293*** 
(0.149) 0.3564 
 
NOTE:  Coefficients are in units of percentage points (cf. definition of EMPGT in Table 3).   Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.   
 
*, **, *** Indicate coefficients are significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and1 percent level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
 
SOURCE:  Row (1) results are obtained from estimating the equation described in footnote 17.  Rows (2) through (4) are obtained 
from estimating equation (2).   
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TABLE 6 
Further Analysis of Estimated Impacts of New Jersey’s Tax Cuts 
(Dependent Variable = EMPGT) 
Row 
BEA 
Economic 
Areas 
Number of 
Observations/ 
Counties 
Estimation 
Procedure 
Estimated 
TAXCUT 
Coefficient 
Estimated 
POST93 
Coefficient 
Estimated 
NY-DUMMY 
Coefficient 
R2 
        
(1) 10-14 1260/140 OLS-With Corrected Standard Errors 
0.390 
(0.787) 
1.328*** 
(0.294) ---- 
0.3820 
 
(2) 10 and 12 684/76 OLS-With Corrected Standard Errors 
0.424 
(0.817) 
1.293*** 
(0.377) ---- 0.3564 
        
(3) 10-14 1260/140 FGLS 0.385 (0.766) 
1.284*** 
(0.236) ---- ---- 
(4) 10 and 12 684/76 FGLS 0.562 (0.777) 
1.114*** 
(0.285) ---- ---- 
        
(5) 10-14 1260/140 OLS-With Corrected Standard Errors 
0.389 
(0.799) 
1.328*** 
(0.326) 
-0.003 
(0.603) 
 
0.3820 
(6) 10 and 12 684/76 OLS-With Corrected Standard Errors 
0.435 
(0.866) 
1.282*** 
(0.475) 
0.043 
(0.692) 0.3564 
        
(7) 10-14 1260/140 FGLS 0.386 (0.776) 
1.283*** 
(0.267) 
0.004 
(0.573) 
---- 
 
(8) 10 and 12 684/76 FGLS 0.649 (0.801) 
1.028*** 
(0.345) 
0.265 
(0.610) 
---- 
 
NOTE:  Coefficients are in units of percentage points (cf. definition of EMPGT in Table 3).  Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.   
 
*,**, *** indicate coefficients are significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level (two-tailed test), respectively. 
 
SOURCE:  Rows (1) through (4) are obtained from estimating equation (2) in the text, and Rows (5) through (8) are obtained from 
estimating equation (4).  In all cases, estimation procedures incorporated the error structure given in equation (3). 
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FIGURE 1A 
Geographic Area Defined By BEA Mideast Region 
 
FIGURE 1B 
Geographic Area Defined by BEA Economic Areas 10-14 
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FIGURE 2 
Individual TAXCUT Estimates for Each of New Jersey’s 21 Counties 
 
 
 
NOTE: This figure represents estimated coefficients of individual TAXCUT dummy variables for 
the respective counties.  Estimates are obtained using the OLS model of equation (3) with 
TAXCUT dummy variables for each of New Jersey's 21 counties. 
 
-0.038 - -0.027
-0.027 - -0.016
-0.016 - -0.004
-0.004 - 0.007
0.007 - 0.019
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1 A similar conclusion has been found in the empirical literature addressing the more general relationship between 
government activities and economic growth (Polzin, 2001; Poot, 2000). 
2 In contrast, Miller and Russek (1997) find a negative relationship between taxes and economic growth even when 
tax revenues are used to finance public services. 
3 Wasylenko (1997, page 38) characterizes the results as "not very reliable" and Bartik (1997, page 67) suggests that 
the results are "quite fragile."  McGuire (1992, page 458) concludes "that the effect of state and local tax policy are 
so uncertain that concern over this issue should not be a driving force in general policy decisions." 
4 Michigan is also prominently cited for its large tax cuts during the Engler administration.  However, Michigan 
makes a poor case study since its economy is heavily focused on a single industry (automobiles) that is driven 
primarily by developments in the national economy.  Besley and Case (2000) discuss necessary conditions for a 
policy variable to be employed as an exogenous explanatory variable in cross-sectional analyses of policy incidence. 
5 This is the approach suggested by Bartik (1997, page 68).  
6 The political affiliations of the governors are listed in American Political Leaders, 1789-2000, Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc (2000).  Whitman was elected Governor of New Jersey in 1993. 
7 According to Nelson (2000), the imposition of tax policy changes during the first year of a governor’s term is not 
unusual. 
8 In fact, “Republican Christie Whitman…had made opposition to [Democratic incumbent governor] Florio’s tax 
policies the hallmark of her dramatic run against [Senator] Bill Bradley in 1990 (Mullaney, 1994, page 267).” 
9 The Mideast Region as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) includes Delaware, Maryland, New 
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania.  While the District of Columbia is also included, we restrict our discussion to 
the five states.  
10 The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) State Tax Actions provides yearly summaries of 
legislative actions taken by states and estimates of corresponding revenue impacts.  All of the Mideast states 
legislated changes in various different taxes during the period.  A summary is available from the authors by request.   
11 The New York figures are misleading in this calculation due to the implementation of health care provider taxes 
that may be partially or even completely returned to providers through the Medicaid leveraging schemes.  See Reed 
and Rogers (2000) for a discussion of measurement errors associated with Medicaid schemes and other 
idiosyncrasies associated with cross-state revenue comparisons. 
12 The NCSL classifies tax changes as major if they are at least one percent of state tax revenues in the previous 
fiscal year. 
13 Tax liability measures of the size of tax changes are not available for years prior to 1994. 
14 Surveys of event studies in economics and finance are given by MacKinlay (1997) and Lamdin (2001).  
15 Employment data are from the Regional Economic Information Systems 1969-1997 series produced by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
16 The simple model includes a constant, a dummy variable taking the value 1 during the years 1994-1997, as well as 
the usual assumptions concerning the error terms.  
17 The estimation equation is EMGTit=αi+βPOST93t+εit, εit~N(0,σ), i = 1,2,..21, t = 1989,1990,..1997, and POST93t 
= 1 if t > 1993. 
18 For example, Carlino and DeFina (1998) show that U.S. regions have differential responses to unexpected 
monetary policy changes. 
19 The total number of observations is N×T, where T is the number of years in the panel. 
20 Of course, representing tax changes with a series of dummy variables raises concerns that the dummy variables 
measure the influence of factors other than the tax changes. 
21 Note from Table 1 that the 1994 New Jersey tax cuts were effective retroactively, so that they had revenue 
impacts during the same fiscal year in which they were adopted. 
22 For example, the estimated sizes of New Jersey’s tax cuts reported in Table 2, obtained from NCSL State Tax 
Action publications, differ substantially from those reported in Table 1, obtained from the Office of Tax Analysis, 
Department of Treasury, State of New Jersey (1998).  Various factors cause the deviations in estimates.   The NCSL 
estimates are obtained from surveys of legislative staff which inquires about major legislative actions in the year 
based on the previous year’s revenues. The tax office uses the current year revenue estimates includes all tax law 
changes affecting revenue during the year.   
23 Another issue concerns the potential effects of spillovers from New Jersey tax cuts to the neighboring counties, or 
in the opposite direction.  Following yardstick competition models, the New Jersey tax cuts may have played a role 
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in instigating the subsequent tax changes in New York and Pennsylvania.  This would cause the estimates of the tax 
cut impacts using the regional subunits to be biased downward.  However, as discussed before, the New York tax 
cuts were essentially delays of legislated tax cuts from before 1990.  The Pennsylvania tax cuts were more targeted 
toward businesses and lower income taxpayers.  Thus, it is not clear that yardstick competition was the major factor 
in this case.  On the other hand, spillovers from New York and Philadelphia to New Jersey counties would bias 
estimated impacts upward when using the Mideast Region in the analysis. 
24 This specification can be rewritten as Yt= βo + β1Xt + μt where μt  = ρμt-1  + εt.  Substituting for μt and solving 
gives Yt= (βo - ρβo) + β1Xt + ρYt-1 - ρβ1Xt-1 + εt. Thus, our specification is tantamount to estimating Yt using a lagged 
dependent variable.   
25 The SAS/IML program used to generate the estimates in Table 6 is available from the authors upon request. 
26 The regression underlying these estimates used counties from Economic Areas 10-14. 
